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Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and
social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional
game theory applicable if the game is complicated, and if not, what is? We investigate this question
here, defining a complicated game as one with many possible moves, and therefore many possible
payoffs conditional on those moves. We investigate two-person games in which the players learn
based on experience. By generating games at random we show that under some circumstances the
strategies of the two players converge to fixed points, but under others they follow limit cycles
or chaotic attractors. The dimension of the chaotic attractors can be very high, implying that
the dynamics of the strategies are effectively random. In the chaotic regime the payoffs fluctuate
intermittently, showing bursts of rapid change punctuated by periods of quiescence, similar to what
is observed in fluid turbulence and financial markets. Our results suggest that such intermittency
is a highly generic phenomenon, and that there is a large parameter regime for which complicated
strategic interactions generate inherently unpredictable behavior that is best described in the
language of dynamical systems theory.
Traditional game theory usually gives a good under-
standing for simple games with a few players, or with
only a few possible moves, characterizing the solutions
in terms of their equilibria [1, 2]. The applicability of
this approach is not clear when the game becomes more
complicated, for example due to more players or a larger
strategy space, which can cause an explosion in the num-
ber of possible equilibria [3–6]. This is further compli-
cated if the players are not rational and must learn their
strategies [7–11]. In a few special cases it has been ob-
served that the strategies display complex dynamics and
fail to converge to equilibrium solutions [12–14]. Are such
games special, or is this typical behavior? More gener-
ally, under what circumstances should we expect that
games become so hard to learn that their dynamics fail
to converge? What kind of behavior should we expect
and how should we characterize the solutions?
As an example of what we mean compare the games
of tic-tac-toe and chess. Tic-tac-toe is a simple game
with only 765 possible positions and 26, 830 distinct se-
quences of moves. Young children easily discover the
Nash equilibrium, which results in a draw, at which point
the game becomes uninteresting. In contrast, chess is a
complicated game with roughly 1047 possible positions
and 10123 possible sequences of moves; despite a huge
effort, the Nash equilibrium (corresponding to an ideal
game) remains unknown. Equilibrium concepts of game
theory are not useful in describing complicated games
such as chess or go (which has an even larger game tree
with roughly 10360 possible sequences of moves). An ex-
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ample that is even closer to what we have in mind here
is investing in financial markets, which is a non-zero sum
game where players can choose between thousands of as-
sets and a rich set of possible strategies.
Here we show that if the players use a standard ap-
proach to learning, for complicated games there is a large
parameter regime in which one should expect complex
dynamics. By this we mean that the players never con-
verge to a fixed strategy. Instead their strategies contin-
ually vary as each player responds to past conditions and
attempts to do better than the other players. The tra-
jectories in the strategy space display high-dimensional
chaos, suggesting that for most intents and purposes the
behavior is essentially random, and the future evolution
is inherently unpredictable.
I. MODEL
To address the questions raised above we study two-
player games. For convenience call the two players
Alice and Bob. At each time step t player µ ∈
{Alice = A, Bob = B} chooses between one of N possi-
ble moves, picking the ith move with frequency xµi (t),
where i = 1, . . . , N . The frequency vector xµ(t) =
(xµ1 , . . . , x
µ
N ) is the strategy of player µ. If Alice plays
i and Bob plays j, Alice receives receives payoff ΠAij and
Bob receives payoff ΠBji.
We assume that the players learn their strategies xµ
via a form of reinforcement learning called experience
weighted attraction. This has been extensively studied by
experimental economists who have shown that it provides
a reasonable approximation for how real people learn in
games [7–9]. Actions that have proved to be successful
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2FIG. 1: An illustration of complex learning dynamics, depicted in terms of trajectories of the strategy xµ(t) for different
parameters (β = 0.01). In (a) the attractor is a limit cycle, whereas (b-d) are chaotic attractors of increasingly high dimension.
There are N = 50 possible moves; the upper panel shows an arbitrary three-dimensional projection of each attractor in the
98-dimensional phase space, and lower panels show the strategy as a function of time for the corresponding three coordinates.
For clarity we use logarithmic scale. As the dimension of the attractor increases, so does the range of xµi . For the highest
dimensional case a given move has occasional bursts where it is highly probable, and long periods where it is extremely
improbable (as low as 10−72).
in the past are played more frequently and moves that
have been less successful are played less frequently. To
be more specific, the probability of a given move is
xµi (t) =
eβQ
µ
i (t)∑
k e
βQµk (t)
, (1)
where Qµi is called the attraction for player i to strategy
µ. In the special case of experience weighted attraction
that we use here, Alice’s attractions are updated accord-
ing to
QAi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QAi (t) +
∑
j
ΠAijx
B
j (2)
and similarly for Bob with A and B interchanged.
The dynamics for updating the strategies xµ of the two
players are completely deterministic. This approximates
the situation in which the players vary their strategies
slowly in comparison to the timescale on which they play
the game.
The key parameters that characterize the learning
strategy are α and β. The parameter β is called the
intensity of choice; when β is large a small historical ad-
vantage for a given move causes that move to be very
probable, and when β = 0 all moves are equally likely.
The parameter α specifies the memory in the learning;
when α= 1 there is no memory of previous learning steps,
and when α = 0 all learning steps are remembered and
are given equal weight, regardless of how far in the past.
The case α = 0 corresponds to the much-studied replica-
tor dynamics used to describe evolutionary processes in
population biology [15–17].
We choose games at random by drawing the elements
of the payoff matrices Πµij from a normal distribution [3–
6, 18]. The mean and the covariance are chosen so that
E[Πµij ] = 0, E[(Π
µ
ij)
2] = 1/N , and E[ΠAijΠ
B
ji] = Γ/N ,
where E[x] denotes the average of x. The variable Γ is a
crucial parameter which measures the deviation from a
zero-sum game. When Γ = −1 the game is zero sum, i.e.
the amount Alice wins is equal to the amount Bob loses,
whereas when Γ = 0 their payoffs are uncorrelated.
II. RESULTS
We simulate randomly constructed games with N = 50
possible moves, corresponding to a 98 dimensional state
space (there are two 50 dimensional strategy vectors and
two probability constraints). The behavior observed de-
pends on the parameters. In some cases we see stable
learning dynamics, in which the strategies xµ of both
players converge on a fixed point. For a large section of
the parameter space, however, the strategies converge to
a more complicated orbit, either a limit cycle or a chaotic
attractor. We characterize the local stability properties
of the attractors by numerically computing the Lyapunov
exponents λi, i = 1, . . . , 2N − 2, which quantify the rate
of expansion or contraction of nearby points in the state
3space. The Lyapunov exponents also determine the Lya-
punov dimension D, which measures the number of de-
grees of freedom of the motion on the attractor.
We give several examples of the observed learning dy-
namics at different parameter values in Fig. 1. These
include a limit cycle and chaotic attractors of varying di-
mensionality. There can also be long transients in which
the trajectory follows a complicated orbit for a long time
and then suddenly collapses into a fixed point. In general
the behavior observed depends on the random draws of
the payoff matrices Πµij , but as we move away from the
stability boundary, for a given set of parameters we ob-
serve fairly consistent behavior .
Simulating games at many different parameter values
reveals the stability diagram given in Fig. 2. Roughly
speaking we find that the dynamics are stable [19] when
Γ ≈ −1 (zero sum games) and α is large (short memory),
i.e. in the lower right of the diagram, and unstable when
Γ ≈ 0 (uncorrelated payoffs) and α is small (long mem-
ory), i.e. in the upper left. Interestingly, for reasons that
we do not understand the highest dimensional behavior is
observed when the payoffs are moderately anti-correlated
(Γ ≈ −0.6) and when players have long-memory (α ≈ 0).
In order to make the problem analytically tractable
we have made specific choices in the parameters for ex-
perience weighted attraction (EWA). Comparison with
behavioral experiments modeled with EWA as reported
in [7] shows that the particular form we are using here
is roughly within the range observed in real experi-
ments. Values for memory-loss parameters and intensity
of choice reported from experiments suggest that real-
world decision making may well operate near or in the
chaotic phase (see Supplementary Information). Most
experimental data is limited to low-dimensional games
however, whereas here we study games with a large num-
ber of possible moves. A good example where high di-
mensional chaotic behavior is likely is in financial mar-
kets, where there are a huge number of possible moves
and learning times are measured in years. High dimen-
sional chaotic behavior can be effectively indistinguish-
able from noise.
A good approximation of the boundary between the
stable and unstable regions of the parameter space can be
computed analytically using techniques from statistical
physics. We use path-integral methods from the theory
of disordered systems [5, 20] to compute the stability in
the limit of infinite payoff matrices, N →∞. We do this
in a continuous-time limit where, for fixed Γ, stability
then depends only on the ratio α/β (see Supplementary
Information).
We have simulated games for various values of N . If
D > 0 at smallN , the dimensionD tends to increase with
N . At this stage we have been unable to tell whether D
reaches a finite limit or grows without bound as N →∞.
An interesting property of this system is the time de-
pendence of the received payoffs. As shown in Fig. 3,
when the dynamics are chaotic the total payoff to all the
players varies, with intermittent bursts of large fluctua-
FIG. 2: Stability diagram showing where stable vs. chaotic
learning is likely (β = 0.01). The solid line is the stabil-
ity boundary estimated using path-integral methods. The
coloured squares are from simulations of the learning dynam-
ics and represent the typical dimension of the attractor (av-
eraged over 10 or more independent payoff matrices per data
point).
FIG. 3: Chaotic dynamics display clustered volatility. We plot
the difference of payoffs on successive time steps for case (c)
in Fig. 1. The amplitude of the fluctuations increases with
the dimension of the attractor.
tions punctuated by relative quiescence. This is observed,
although to varying degrees, throughout the chaotic part
of the parameter space. There is a strong resemblance
to the clustered volatility observed in financial markets,
which in turn resembles the intermittency of fluid turbu-
lence [12, 21]. We also observe heavy tails in the distri-
bution of the fluctuations, as described in more detail in
the Supplementary Information. This suggests that these
properties, which have received a great deal of attention
in studies of financial markets, may occur simply because
they are generic properties of complicated games [22].
4III. WHY IS DIMENSIONALITY RELEVANT?
The dimensionality D is relevant to this problem be-
cause high dimensionality suggests that failure to con-
verge to a fixed point is independent of the learning al-
gorithm, i.e. the game is intrinsically hard to learn. The
fact that the equilibria of a game are unlearnable with
any particular learning algorithm, such as reinforcement
learning, does not imply that learning is not possible
with some other learning algorithm. For example, if the
learning dynamics settles into a limit cycle or a low di-
mensional attractor, a careful observer could collect data
and make better predictions about the other player using
the method of analogues [23], or refinements based on lo-
cal approximation [24]. If the dimension of the chaotic
attractor is too high, however, the curse of dimension-
ality makes this impossible with any reasonable amount
of data [24]. This suggests that there exists no learning
algorithm that can provide an improvement when learn-
ing must occur inductively based on past data. The ob-
servation of high-dimensional dynamics here leads us to
conjecture that there are some games that are inherently
unlearnable, in the sense that any learning algorithms
will inevitably result in high-dimensional chaotic learn-
ing dynamics (See also Sato et al. [14]).
Our work here makes it possible to predict a priori the
qualitative properties of the learning dynamics of any
given complicated two player game under reinforcement
learning. This is because the payoff matrix of any given
game is a possible draw from an ensemble of random
games. One can make a good estimate of the stability
properties of the learning dynamics by locating the game
and the learning parameters in the stability diagram of
Fig. 2. We have shown that a key property of a game
is its “zero-sumness”, characterized by Γ. Games be-
come harder to learn (in the sense that the strategies do
not converge) when they are non-zero-sum, particularly
if the players use learning algorithms with long mem-
ory. This analysis can potentially be extended to mul-
tiplayer games, games on networks, alternative learning
algorithms, etc.
Our results suggest that under many circumstances it
is more useful to abandon the tools of classic game theory
in favor of those of dynamical systems. It also suggests
that many behaviors that have attracted considerable in-
terest, such as clustered volatility in financial markets,
may simply be specific examples of a highly generic phe-
nomenon, and should be expected to occur in a wide
variety of different situations.
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Appendix A: Experience weighted attraction learning
1. General definitions for multi-player games
We here briefly describe the experience weighted attraction learning (EWA) model put forward in [8, 9, 25]. Consider
a game played by p players, who each choose from a set of N actions (pure strategies) at each time step[40]. In the
EWA model the probability for player µ ∈ {1, . . . , p} to choose action i ∈ {1, . . . , N} at time t is
xµi (t) =
eβQ
µ
i (t)∑
k e
βQµk (t)
, (A1)
where the {Qµi } are referred to as attractions or propensities[41]. The basic idea is that Qµi (t) gives the “attraction”
of player µ to action i at time t, based on how successful strategy i has been in the past. The model parameter β ≥ 0
is called the intensity of choice. For β = 0 players pick actions with equal probability (i.e. they play completely at
random), and for β →∞ each player’s choice is deterministic, i.e. that player will always choose the same action for
given values of Qµi , namely the action with the highest attraction.
The update rule for the attractions {Qµi } in the EWA model reads [8, 9, 25]
Qµi (t+ 1) =
φN (t)Qµi (t) + [δ + (1− δ)I(i, sµ(t)]Πµ(i,−µ (t))
N (t) , (A2)
where the quantity N (t) is updated according to
N (t+ 1) = φ(1− κ)N (t) + 1, (A3)
see [8]. The notation is explained below:
5• We write sµ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , N} for the action player µ takes at time step t in a given realization of the dynamics.
The notation −µ labels all players other than µ, i.e. −µ is the set {1, . . . , p}\{µ}. The notation s−µ(t) indicates
the set of actions that the opponents of player µ took in a given round. Thus s−µ ∈ {1, . . . , N}p−1 is a
(p− 1)-component vector, each component of which is one of the possible actions.
• For a given s−µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , N}p−1 the quantity Πµ(i, s−µ(t)) is a payoff matrix element, and indicates the
payoff player µ receives when playing pure strategy i and facing the actions s−µ(t) of the other agents at time t.
• The variable N indicates a weight factor. An initial condition needs to be specified, which is then updated
according to relation (A3). When φ(1− κ) = 1, this is just the number of times the game has been played. In
this case, since N cancels in the first term in the numerator on the RHS of Eq. (A2), and since it divides the
second term, as time goes on the influence of the updates becomes smaller and smaller, i.e. past moves have
more weight than recent moves and the behavior becomes “set”.
• The notation I(·, ·) stands for the indicator function (also called the Kronecker delta), i.e. I(a, b) = 1 if a = b
and I(a, b) = 0 otherwise.
• The parameter δ specifies the relative weighting given to strategies that are played vs. those that are not played.
In the case of δ = 1 players update all attractions Qµi in every round, irrespective of what actions they actually
took. The choice δ = 0 corresponds to a case where only the scores of strategies that are actually used in a
given round are updated after that round.
• The parameter κ interpolates between average reinforcement learning (κ = 0) and cumulative reinforcement
learning (κ = 1), see [8, 9, 25]; we have N (t) = 1 for all t if κ = 1, the attractions Qµi then represent the
cumulative outcome of all past play (depending on the choice of φ potentially discounted over time), for κ = 0
the normalisation factor N (t) grows with time.
• The parameter φ specifies the weight of outcomes of play in the distant past relative to more recent iterations.
If κ = 1 and φ = 1 all past experience carries equal weight, no matter how much time has elapsed, for φ = 0 only
the most recent round affects the players’ future decisions. Intermediate values of φ correspond to exponential
discounting.
2. The specific case that we study here
There are many parameters within the formalism of experience weighted attraction, and it is beyond the scope
of this paper to investigate all of the possible cases. We thus restrict ourselves to a particular case that is both
analytically tractable and reasonably close to how real people play.
We first assume that Eq. (A3) reaches a fixed point N ∗ in the long-run. Letting N (t+ 1) = N (t) = N ∗ gives
N ∗ = 1
1− φ(1− κ) . (A4)
The update rule then simplifies to
Qµi (t+ 1) = φQ
µ
i (t) + (1− φ(1− κ))[δ + (1− δ)I(i, sµ(t)]Πµ(i, s−µ(t)). (A5)
We will focus here on the case δ = 1, i.e. all strategy scores are updated in every iteration. Then we have
Qµi (t+ 1) = φQ
µ
i (t) + (1− φ(1− κ))Πµ(i, s−µ(t)). (A6)
Focusing on cumulative re-inforcement learning [8, 9, 25], i.e. the case κ = 1, and replacing φ → 1 − α for later
convenience, we have[42]
Qµi (t+ 1) = (1− α)Qµi (t) + Πµ(i, s−µ(t)). (A7)
Eq. (A7) is the learning rule used in [14, 15]. The parameter α describes memory loss. For α = 0 past payoffs are
not discounted, and the memory of players covers the full history of play. For 0 < α < 1 past payoffs are taken into
account with exponentially decreasing weights.
To summarise, the learning model we investigate is defined by Eq. (A1) together with Eq. (A7):
6• Eq. (A1) specifies how a given player µ ∈ {1, . . . , p} translates his or her set of attractions Qµi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
into a mixed strategy (xµ1 , . . . , x
µ
N ). He or she will choose action µ ∈ {1, . . . , N} with the probabilities defined
by Eq. (A1).
• Eq. (A7) specifies how the attractions are updated from time step t to t+ 1 once all players have chosen their
actions in time step t.
The correspondence with the EWA model of [8] can be summarized as follows:
model of Camerer et al. ↔ notation in present work
P iµ ↔ xµi ,
Aiµ ↔ Qµi ,
φ ↔ 1− α. (A8)
3. Relation to experimental data
Parameters of the EWA learning model were fit to real-world data in [25], see in particular Table 4. This table
shows that there is substantial variation in the parameters that provide a best fit to the data across different games.
While we have chosen parameters that were tractable for the theoretical calculations that follow, comparison to their
experimental results indicates that these values are fairly reasonable. For example, they find values of the parameter
κ in the range 0.15-0.99; we fix κ = 1. The model parameter δ obtained from experimental data varies from δ = 0 to
δ = 0.94, suggesting that there is no clear conclusion on whether or not players use forgone payoffs in their adaptation;
we fix δ = 1, i.e. the propensities of all strategies are updated at every step.
The most interesting model parameters from the point of view of our analysis are the memory-loss parameter
α and the intensity of choice β. For a fixed game, these parameters largely determine whether or not one should
expect convergence or chaotic motion. More precisely the ratio α/β is the crucial indicator for the onset of chaos, as
explained above. Pooled data from [25] suggests a ratio of α/β ≈ 0.03 (but again with considerable variation across
games). Depending on the character of the game (zero-sum or not) this can position such experiments inside the
chaotic phase, see Fig. 5. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the games used in the experiments of [25] are
low-dimensional, in the sense that each player has the choice only between a small number of moves. Care needs to
be taken when extrapolating results for high-dimensional random games to these cases. Nonetheless, if one assumes
that parameters would not dramatically change in moving from simple games to complicated games, then the data
and model fitting of [8], taken together with our results, suggests that real-world learning in non-zero sum games may
well operate in or near the chaotic phase.
4. Adiabatic limit and deterministic learning
The update of Eq. (A7) is intrinsically stochastic, as the (p− 1)-component action vector s−µ(t) at time t is drawn
according to the mixed strategy profiles of the p − 1 opponents player µ is facing. More precisely, player µ will face
a specific realization of the actions s−µ = (s1, . . . , sµ−1, sµ+1, . . . , sp) ∈ {1, . . . , N}p−1 of all the other players with
probability
x−µs−µ =
∏
ν 6=µ
xνsν . (A9)
In order to simplify the problem we follow [14, 15] and consider an adiabatic limit of this process. This corresponds
to averaging over batches of a large (infinite) number of rounds between two adaptation steps i.e. to the replacement
Πµ(i, s−µ(t)) −→ Πµi (t) :=
∑
s−µ
Πµ(i, s−µ)x−µs−µ(t). (A10)
in Eq. (A7). The sum over s−µ here runs over all elements of {1, . . . , N}p−1. We have introduced the notation Πµi (t)
to indicate that the right-hand-side is the mean of the left-hand-side, i.e. Πµi (t) is the expected payoff for player µ if
she chooses to play action i and given her opponents’ mixed strategy profiles at time t. In this sense the adiabatic
limit can be understood as describing the dynamics on expectation. Fluctuation effects induced by the stochastic
choice of pure actions by the players are here neglected, see however [27–29] for systematic studies of noisy learning
7in simple games.
The equation for updating the attractions becomes
Qµi (t+ 1) = (1− α)Qµi (t) + Πµi (t). (A11)
Taking into account Eq. (A1) the learning process can then be described by the following deterministic map
xµi (t+ 1) =
xµi (t)
1−αeβΠ
µ
i (t)∑
k x
µ
k(t)
1−αeβΠ
µ
k (t)
. (A12)
Here, each player chooses between N actions, i = 1, . . . , N , and there are p players, so we have p×N variables {xµi }
in total. These variables satisfy the constraints
∑
i x
µ
i (t) = 1 at all times t for all µ = 1, . . . , p. Eq. (A12) therefore
defines a map in a p× (N − 1)-dimensional phase space.
Appendix B: Details of the two-player learning model
1. Definition of the dynamics
While the previous sections described learning in a general p-player game, we will now restrict the further discussion
to the case p = 2, i.e. to two-player games. The two players are Alice (A) and Bob (B). Each of them has N strategies
to choose from. Eqs. (A7) then read
QAi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QAi (t) + ΠA(i, sB(t)),
QBi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QBi (t) + ΠB(i, sA(t)). (B1)
Simplication of notation:
We will write xi(t) for the probability with which Alice uses action i at time t, and similarly yi(t) is the probability
with which Bob plays action i at that time[43]. For simplicity we will change the notation by letting aij be the payoff
Alice receives when she plays action i and when Bob plays action j. The payoff for Bob in this situation will be bji.
The two N ×N matrices (aij) and (bij), with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} then define an asymmetric two-player game, in which
each player has N pure strategies to choose from. Taking the deterministic limit, as described above, the update rules
for the attractions now read
QAi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QAi (t) +
∑
j
aijyj(t)
QBi (t+ 1) = (1− α)QBi (t) +
∑
j
bijxj(t), (B2)
and the map of strategy updates is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j aijyj(t)∑
k xk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j akjyj(t)
, yi(t+ 1) =
yi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bijxj(t)∑
k yk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bkjxj(t)
. (B3)
2. Relation between discrete-time dynamics and continuous-time Sato-Crutchfield equations
Chaotic motion in learning dynamics of the above type has previously been reported for relatively low-dimensional
games in [14, 15]. These studies were carried out for continuous-time processes, and it is therefore useful to elaborate
on the relation of the discrete-time map defined by Eq. (B3) and the continuous-time dynamics of Sato et al[44].
The discrete-time dynamics of Eq. (B3) can be written as
xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j aijyj(t)
Zx(t)
,
yj(t+ 1) =
yj(t)
1−αeβ
∑
i bjixi(t)
Zy(t)
, (B4)
8where we define the normalisation factors
Zx(t) =
∑
k
xk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j akjyj(t), Zy(t) =
∑
k
yk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bkjxj(t). (B5)
The continuous-time Sato-Crutchfield dynamics on the other hand is given by
x˙i = xi
∑
j
aijyj − α′ lnxi − Z ′x
 ,
y˙j = yj
(∑
i
bjixi − α′ ln yj − Z ′y
)
, (B6)
see [14, 15] for details. The parameter α′ indicates memory loss in this continuous dynamics, and it is hence analogous
to the parameter α in the above map (B4). We will detail the relation between α and α′ further below. Similarly, the
role of Z ′x and Z
′
y in Eqs. (B6) is to enforce the normalisation
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi = 1 at all times[45]. These quantities
can be thought of as Lagrange multipliers, they can be expressed explicitly as
Z ′x =
∑
i
xi
∑
j
aijyj − α′ lnxi
 , Z ′y = ∑
i
yi
∑
j
bijxj − α′ ln yi
 . (B7)
Similar to what is the case for α and α′ there is a close relation between Zx and Z ′x and between Zy and Z
′
y respectively.
This will be explained in more detail below.
Limit of small β:
In order to relate the discrete-time update rule to the continuous-time Sato-Crutchfield dynamics we consider the
limit β  1 in Eq. (B4). One first writes
lnxi(t+ 1) = (1− α) lnxi(t) + β
∑
j
aijyj(t)− lnZx(t), (B8)
and similarly for the second equation of (B4). This is valid for all β, and can be re-arranged to give
lnxi(t+ 1)− lnxi(t)
β
= −α
β
lnxi(t) +
∑
j
aijyj(t)− Z ′x(t) (B9)
where Z ′x(t) = lnZx(t)/β. In the limit β → 0, fixing the ratio α/β during the limiting procedure, and upon appropriate
re-scaling of time, this turns into
d
dt
lnxi(t) = −α
β
lnxi(t) +
∑
j
aijyj(t)− Z ′x(t), (B10)
i.e.
x˙i(t) = xi(t)
−α
β
lnxi(t) +
∑
j
aijyj(t)− Z ′x(t)
 , (B11)
which is exactly the first equation of the continuous-time dynamics (B6), with the replacement α′ = limβ→0 α/β. A
similar argument can be made for the dynamics of yi(t).
We conclude that the small-β limit of the discrete-time dynamics at memory-loss parameter α leads to the
continuous-time Sato-Crutchfield dynamics with memory-loss parameter α′ = α/β, after a re-scaling of time.
Relation of fixed-points
For any choice of β the fixed points of the equations
xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j aijyj(t)
Zx(t)
,
yi(t+ 1) =
yi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bijxj(t)
Zy(t)
(B12)
9fulfill
lnx∗i = (1− α) lnx∗i + β
∑
j
aijy
∗
j − lnZ∗x, (B13)
with a similar equation for y∗j . Asterisks here indicate quantities evaluated at the fixed point. We have here assumed
that fixed points lie in the interior of the strategy simplex, i.e. that x∗i > 0 and y
∗
i > 0 for all i.
These fixed-point conditions can be reduced to
− α
β
lnx∗i +
∑
j
aijy
∗
j − Z ′∗x = 0
−α
β
ln y∗j +
∑
i
bjix
∗
i − Z ′∗y = 0, (B14)
which reproduces the fixed-point condition of the continuous dynamics, see Eqs. (B6).
Summary:
(i) Up to a re-scaling of time the small-β limit of the discrete-time dynamics at parameters α, β corresponds to the
continuous-time Sato-Crutchfield dynamics at parameter α′ = α/β.
(ii) For any choice of β the fixed points of the map at parameters α, β are identical to those of the continuous-time
dynamics at α′ = α/β.
(iii) Provided a fixed point of the map exists, its components only depend on the ratio α/β.
In the following we will use the notation r = β/α to denote the relevant control parameter of the continuous dynamics.
Given that α can be viewed as a damping parameter, and β as a forcing term, the ratio r = β/α plays a role similar
to that of a Reynolds number in fluid dynamics [26].
3. Large random two-player games
We will now consider the case of large random games. To this end we will follow the standard spin-glass conventions
[5, 6, 31, 34] and focus on payoff matrices with elements drawn from Gaussian distributions. These distributions are
fully characterized by their first and second moments. Specifically we will choose the payoff matrix elements {aij , bij}
such that
E[aij ] = E[bij ] = 0,
E[(aij)2] = E[(bij)2] =
1
N
,
E[aijbji] =
Γ
N
(B15)
for all pairs i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The significance of the parameter Γ will be explained below. The notation E[· · · ] denotes
the average over the distribution of payoff matrices. Every single element of the payoff bi-matrix is a Gaussian random
variable of mean zero. It is important to stress that while the payoff matrices are drawn at random at the beginning,
they remain fixed during the time evolution of the dynamics. In the language of spin glass theory [31] they constitute
the quenched disorder of the problem. The factors of 1/N in Eqs. (B15) indicate that each payoff matrix element
is of magnitude 1/
√
N . This scaling with N is standard in spin glass theory, and chosen to ensure a non-trivial
thermodynamic limit, N → ∞, as explained below. We point out that payoff matrix elements occur in the learning
process of Eqs. (B4) only in combinations of the type βaij and βbij . The choice of scaling of the payoff matrices is
therefore equivalent to re-scaling the intensity of choice β.
The parameter Γ in Eqs. (B15) measures correlations between the payoff matrix elements aij and bji. For example
if Γ = −1 one has
E
[
(aij + bji)
2
]
= E
[
(aij)
2 + (bji)
2 + 2aijbji
]
= 0, (B16)
i.e. aij = −bji with probability one, corresponding to a zero-sum game. If Γ = 1 one has
E
[
(aij − bji)2
]
= 0, (B17)
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i.e. aij = bji almost surely. For Γ = 0 the payoffs aij and bji are uncorrelated. Choices in the interval Γ ∈ [−1, 1]
interpolate between the extremes. We focus on the regime of anti-correlation, −1 ≤ Γ ≤ 0 throughout this paper, as
we expect this to be more realistic than positively correlated payoffs.
Again, following the spin-glass conventions, and to make sure the thermodynamic limit is well defined, we will
re-scale the {xi, yi} and consider the normalisation
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi = N . Each of the variables {xi, yi} is then of order
N0.
At finite N the update rules in discrete time are given by
xi(t+ 1) = N
xi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j aijyj(t)∑
k xk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j akjyj(t)
yi(t+ 1) = N
yi(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bijxj(t)∑
k yk(t)
1−αeβ
∑
j bkjxj(t)
. (B18)
The above choice of scaling now becomes more transparent. The exponentials contain terms of the form
∑N
j=1 aijyj
and
∑N
j=1 bijxj , which are well defined and of order one in the thermodynamic limit (N →∞) with the above scaling.
In continuous time one has
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
=
−r−1 lnxi(t) +∑
j
aijyj(t)− Z ′x(t)
 ,
y˙j(t)
yj(t)
=
(
−r−1 ln yj(t) +
∑
i
bjixi(t)− Z ′y(t)
)
(B19)
as before, but the Lagrange multipliers are now chosen such that
∑
i xi(t) =
∑
i yi(t) = N at all times[46].
Appendix C: Path-integral analysis
a. Generating functional description
We will here describe the technical details of the path-integral analysis of the dynamics. These techniques are
standard in the theory of disordered systems, see e.g. [31], and in particular [32, 33] for texbook descriptions and a
pedagogic review. They have previously been applied to learning in minority game dynamics in [33]. The original
application to replicator equations is due to Opper and Diederich, see [5, 6, 34]. Other applications of methods from
disordered systems to large random games include the calculation of the number of Nash equilibria [3, 4], and the
dynamics of random replicator dynamics [35, 36].
The starting point is the continuous dynamics
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
=
−r−1 lnxi(t) +∑
j
aijyj(t)− ρx(t) + hx,i(t)
 ,
y˙j(t)
yj(t)
=
(
−r−1 ln yj(t) +
∑
i
bjixi(t)− ρy(t) + hy,i(t)
)
, (C1)
where we use the more compact notation ρx(t) and ρy(t) instead of Z
′
x(t) and Z
′
y(t). These quantities will be treated
as Lagrange multipliers enforcing the normalisation
∑
i xi(t) =
∑
j yj(t) = N . The fields hi,x(t) and hy,i(t) have been
introduced to generate response functions, and will be set to zero at the end of the calculation.
The dynamical generating functional is then given by
Z[ψ,ϕ] =
∫
D[x,y]δ(equations of motion)ei
∑
i
∫
dt{xi(t)ψi(t)+yi(t)ϕi(t)}. (C2)
The source fields ψ and ϕ have been introduced to generate correlation functions, and will eventually be set to zero
at the end of the calculation. The notation δ(equations of motion) indicates that the integral in Eq. (C2) is over
paths of the dynamics (C1) only, i.e. the delta-functions impose Eqs. (C1) for all t and i.
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The next step is to write the delta functions in Eq. (C2) in their Fourier representation. We then find
Z[ϕ,ψ] =
∫
D[x,y, x̂, ŷ] exp
(
i
∑
i
∫
dt
[
x̂i(t)
(
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
−
(
− r−1 lnxi(t) +
∑
j
aijyj(t)
− ρx(t) + hx,i(t)
))])
× exp
i∑
i
∫
dt
ŷi(t)
 y˙i(t)
yi(t)
−
−r−1 ln yi(t) +∑
j
bijxi(t)− ρy(t) + hy,i(t)

× exp
(
i
∑
i
∫
dt [xi(t)ψi(t) + yi(t)ϕi(t)]
)
. (C3)
Next, we isolated the terms containing the quenched disorder (the randomly chosen payoff matrix) elements. One has
Z[ϕ,ψ] =
∫
D[x,y, x̂, ŷ] exp
(
i
∑
i
∫
dt
[
x̂i(t)
(
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
+ r−1 lnxi(t) + ρx(t)− hx,i(t)
)])
× exp
(
i
∑
i
∫
dt
[
ŷi(t)
(
y˙i(t)
yi(t)
+ r−1 ln yi(t) + ρy(t)− hy,i(t)
)])
× exp
(
i
∑
i
∫
dt [xi(t)ψi(t) + yi(t)ϕi(t)]
)
× exp
−i∑
ij
∫
dt [x̂i(t)aijyj(t) + ŷj(t)bjixi(t)]
 . (C4)
We are now in a position to carry out the average over the Gaussian disorder, and to compute E[Z[ψ,ϕ]], where
E[· · · ] denotes the disorder-average. We have
E
exp
−i∑
ij
∫
dt [x̂i(t)aijyj(t) + ŷj(t)bjixi(t)]

=
∏
ij
exp
(
− 1
2N
∫
dtdt′{x̂i(t)x̂i(t′)yj(t)yj(t′) + ŷj(t)ŷj(t′)xi(t)xi(t′)
+ Γx̂i(t)xi(t
′)yj(t)ŷj(t′) + Γŷj(t)yj(t′)xi(t)x̂i(t′)}
)
= exp
(
−1
2
N
∫
dt dt′ [Lx(t, t′)Cy(t, t′) + Ly(t, t′)Cx(t, t′) + 2ΓKx(t, t′)Ky(t′, t)]
)
, (C5)
where we have introduced the short-hands
Cx(t, t
′) = 1N
∑
i xi(t)xi(t
′), Cy(t, t′) = 1N
∑
j yj(t)yj(t
′),
Kx(t, t
′) = 1N
∑
i xi(t)x̂i(t
′), Ky(t, t′) = 1N
∑
j yj(t)ŷj(t
′),
Lx(t, t
′) = 1N
∑
i x̂i(t)x̂i(t
′), Ly(t, t′) = 1N
∑
j ŷj(t)ŷj(t
′). (C6)
These quantities are introduced into the generating functional by means of delta-functions in their integral represen-
tation, e.g.
1 =
∫
D[Cx]
∏
t,t′
δ
(
Cx(t, t
′)− 1
N
∑
i
xi(t)xi(t
′)
)
=
∫
D[Ĉx, C] exp
(
iN
∫
dt dt′Ĉx(t, t′)
(
Cx(t, t
′)−N−1
∑
i
xi(t)xi(t
′)
))
, (C7)
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and similarly for the other order parameters in Eq. (C6). We have chosen the scaling of the conjugate parameter
Ĉ(t, t′) such that the overall exponent carries a prefactor N .
We then find that the disorder-averaged generating functional can be written in the following form
E [Z[ψ,ϕ]] =
∫
D[Cx, Cy, Lx, Ly,Kx,Ky, Ĉx, Ĉy, L̂x, L̂y, K̂x, K̂y] exp
(
N
[
Ψ + Φ + Ω +O(N−1)]) , (C8)
where
Ψ = i
∫
dt dt′
[
Ĉx(t, t
′)Cx(t, t′) + Ĉy(t, t′)Cy(t, t′) + K̂x(t, t′)Kx(t, t′) + K̂y(t, t′)Ky(t, t′)
+L̂x(t, t
′)Lx(t, t′) + L̂y(t, t′)Ly(t, t′)
]
(C9)
results from the introduction of the above order parameters. The term
Φ = −1
2
∫
dt dt′ [Lx(t, t′)Cy(t, t′) + Ly(t, t′)Cx(t, t′) + 2ΓKx(t, t′)Ky(t′, t)] (C10)
comes from the disorder average, and Ω describes the details of the microscopic time evolution
Ω = N−1
∑
i
log
[ ∫
D[xi, x̂i]p
(i)
x,0(xi(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt ψi(t)xi(t)
)
× exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂i(t)
(
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
+ r−1 lnxi(t) + ρx(t)− hx,i(t)
))
× exp
(
−i
∫
dt dt′
[
Ĉx(t, t
′)xi(t)xi(t′) + L̂x(t, t′)x̂i(t)x̂i(t′) + K̂x(t, t′)xi(t)x̂i(t′)
])]
+N−1
∑
i
log
[ ∫
D[yi, ŷi]p
(i)
y,0(yi(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt ϕi(t)yi(t)
)
× exp
(
i
∫
dt ŷi(t)
(
y˙i(t)
yi(t)
+ r−1 ln yi(t) + ρy(t)− hy,i(t)
))
× exp
(
−i
∫
dt dt′
[
Ĉy(t, t
′)yi(t)yi(t′) + L̂y(t, t′)ŷi(t)ŷi(t′) + K̂y(t, t′)yi(t)ŷi(t′)
])]
(C11)
In this expression p
(i)
x,0(·) and p(i)y,0(·) describe the distributions from which initial distributions are drawn.
The next step is to perform the integrals in Eq. (C8) by means of the saddle-point method, valid in the limit
N →∞. This amounts to finding the extrema of the term in the exponent. Setting the variation with respect to the
integration variables Cx,Kx and Lx to zero gives
iĈx(t, t
′) =
1
2
Ly(t, t
′), iK̂x(t, t′) = ΓKy(t′, t), iL̂x(t, t′) =
1
2
Cy(t, t
′), (C12)
and similarly we obtain
iĈy(t, t
′) =
1
2
Lx(t, t
′), iK̂y(t, t′) = ΓKx(t′, t), iL̂y(t, t′) =
1
2
Cx(t, t
′) (C13)
from the variation with respect to Cy,Ky and Ly.
It remains to perform the extremisation with respect to Ĉx, K̂x, L̂x, and with respect to the corresponding quantities
with subscript y. We find
Cx(t, t
′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈xi(t)xi(t′)〉Ω , Cy(t, t′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈yi(t)yi(t′)〉Ω ,
Kx(t, t
′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈xi(t)x̂i(t′)〉Ω , Ky(t, t′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈yi(t)ŷi(t′)〉Ω ,
Lx(t, t
′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈x̂i(t)x̂i(t′)〉Ω , Ly(t, t′) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈ŷi(t)ŷi(t′)〉Ω , (C14)
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where the average 〈. . .〉Ω is to be taken against a measure defined by the exponent of the expression in Eq. (C11), see
e.g. [33, 35, 36] for similar calculations.
Looking back at the definition of the generating functional, Eq. (C3), one also realises that
Cx(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δψi(t)δψi(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
,
Kx(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δψi(t)δhx,i(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
,
Lx(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δhx,i(t)δhx,i(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
, (C15)
and
Cy(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δϕi(t)δϕi(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
,
Ky(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δϕi(t)δhy,i(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
,
Ly(t, t
′) = − lim
N→∞
N−1
∑
i
δ2E [Z[ψ,ϕ]]
δhy,i(t)δhy,i(t′)
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=ψ=h=0
. (C16)
Given that Z[ψ = 0,ϕ = 0,h] = 1 for all h due to normalisation we conclude that Lx(t, t
′) = Ly(t, t′) = 0 for all t, t′.
The variables ψ and ϕ have now served their purpose (to generate correlation functions), and we set them to zero.
We will also assume uniform perturbations hi,x(t) ≡ hx(t) and hy,j(t) = hy(t) for all i, and that initial conditions are
chosen from identical distributions for all components xi and yi (i.e. p
(i)
x,0(·) does not depend on i, and similarly for
p
(i)
y,0(·). Then we have
Ω = log
[ ∫
D[x, x̂]px,0(x(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂(t)
(
x˙(t)
x(t)
+ r−1 lnx(t) + ρx(t)− hx(t)
))
× exp
(
−
∫
dt dt′
[
1
2
Cy(t, t
′)x̂(t)x̂(t′) + iΓGy(t′, t)x(t)x̂(t′)
])]
+ log
[ ∫
D[y, ŷ]py,0(y(0) exp
(
i
∫
dt ŷ(t)
(
y˙(t)
y(t)
+ r−1 ln y(t) + ρy(t)− hy(t)
))
× exp
(
−
∫
dt dt′
[
1
2
Cx(t, t
′)ŷ(t)ŷ(t′) + iΓGx(t, t′)y(t)ŷ(t′)
])]
, (C17)
where we have used the above saddle-point results, and where we have introducedGx(t, t
′) = −iKx(t, t′) andGy(t, t′) =
−iKy(t, t′).
The resulting term
Zeff =
∫
D[x, x̂]D[y, ŷ]px,0(x(0))py,0(y(0) exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂(t)
(
x˙(t)
x(t)
+ r−1 lnx(t) + ρx(t)− hx(t)
))
× exp
(
−
∫
dt dt′
[
1
2
Cy(t, t
′)x̂(t)x̂(t′) + iΓGy(t′, t)x(t)x̂(t′)
])
× exp
(
i
∫
dt ŷ(t)
(
y˙(t)
y(t)
+ r−1 ln y(t) + ρy(t)− hy(t)
))
× exp
(
−
∫
dt dt′
[
1
2
Cx(t, t
′)ŷ(t)ŷ(t′) + iΓGx(t, t′)y(t)ŷ(t′)
])
(C18)
is recognised as the generating function of the effective dynamics
x˙(t) = x(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gy(t, t′)x(t′)− r−1 lnx(t)− ρx(t) + ηx(t) + hx(t)
]
y˙(t) = y(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gx(t, t′)y(t′)− r−1 ln y(t)− ρy(t) + ηy(t) + hy(t)
]
, (C19)
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where
Gx(t, t
′) =
〈
δx(t)
δhx(t′)
〉
∗
, Gy(t, t
′) =
〈
δy(t)
δhy(t′)
〉
∗
,
〈ηx(t)ηx(t′)〉∗ = 〈y(t)y(t′)〉∗ , 〈ηy(t)ηy(t′)〉∗ = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉∗ ,
〈x(t)〉∗ = 〈y(t)〉∗ = 1, (C20)
and where 〈· · ·〉∗ denotes an average over realizations of the effective dynamics (C19). This is to be evaluated at
vanishing perturbation fields hx(t) = hy(t) = 0. It is hence appropriate to consider
x˙(t) = x(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gy(t, t′)x(t′)− r−1 lnx(t)− ρx(t) + ηx(t)
]
,
y˙(t) = y(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gx(t, t′)y(t′)− r−1 ln y(t)− ρy(t) + ηy(t)
]
, (C21)
where[47]
Gx(t, t
′) =
〈
δx(t)
δηx(t′)
〉
∗
, Gy(t, t
′) =
〈
δy(t)
δηy(t′)
〉
∗
,
〈ηx(t)ηx(t′)〉∗ = Cy(t, t′) = 〈y(t)y(t′)〉∗ , 〈ηy(t)ηy(t′)〉∗ = Cx(t, t′) = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉∗ ,
〈x(t)〉∗ = 〈y(t)〉∗ = 1. (C22)
We note that the path-integral analysis up to this point can also be carried out for the discrete dynamics. In this
case one obtains the following effective process:
x(t+ 1) =
x(t)1−α exp (β [Γ
∑
t′ Gy(t, t
′)x(t′) + ηx(t)])
Zx(t)
y(t+ 1) =
y(t)1−α exp (β [Γ
∑
t′ Gx(t, t
′)y(t′) + ηy(t)])
Zy(t)
, (C23)
with self-consistency relations as in Eq. (C22). Due to causality we have G(t, t′) = 0 for t′ ≥ 0, both in the continuous-
time and in the discrete-time case, so the integrals over t′ in Eqs. (C21) and the sums in Eq. (C23) only extend over
the range t′ < t.
b. Fixed point analysis
In the stationary state all two time quantities (e.g. Cx(t, t
′), Gx(t, t′)) become functions of time differences only, i.e.
Gx(t, t
′) = Gx(τ), where τ = t − t′, and similar for the other two-time observables. Assuming the dynamics reaches
a fixed point one also has Cx(t, t
′) ≡ const and similarly for Cy(t, t′).
Fixed points of the discrete-time effective dynamics (C23) are given by
− α lnx∗ + Γβχyx∗ + βη∗x − lnZ∗x = 0,
−α ln y∗ + Γβχxy∗ + βη∗y − lnZ∗y = 0, (C24)
where we have written χx =
∫∞
0
dτ Gx(τ) and χy =
∫∞
0
dτ Gy(τ). An asterisk as a superscript indicates fixed-point
quantities as before. From the continuous-time effective process, Eq. (C21), one obtains the equivalent fixed-point
condition
− r−1 lnx∗ + Γχyx∗ + η∗x − ρ∗x = 0,
−r−1 ln y∗ + Γχxy∗ + η∗y − ρ∗y = 0. (C25)
Due to symmetry we expect χx = χy ≡ χ, ρ∗x = ρ∗y ≡ ρ, see also [3, 4]. We will also write
q ≡ 〈(x∗)2〉∗ = 〈(y∗)2〉∗ . (C26)
Let us write ηx =
√
qz with z a static Gaussian random variable of mean zero and unit variance. Then let x(z) be
the positive solution, x, of
− r−1 lnx+ Γχx+√qz − ρ = 0. (C27)
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The order parameters χ, q and ρ are to be determined from the self-consistency relations
χ =
1√
q
〈
∂x(z)
∂z
〉
∗
, q =
〈
(x(z))2
〉
∗ , 〈x(z)〉∗ = 1, (C28)
in other words, we have
χ =
1√
q
∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
∂x(z)
∂z
,
q =
∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x(z)2,
1 =
∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x(z), (C29)
where Dz = dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2. These equations fully determine the statistical properties of the fixed points of the dynamics,
and can be used to compute quantities such as the distribution of frequencies with which pure actions are played
(i.e. the shape of the resulting mixed strategy profile), or the entropy of mixed strategies. Theoretical predictions are
tested against simulations below (see Sec. D 1).
c. Linear stability analysis
We will now carry out a linear stability analysis of the effective dynamics in the continuous-time case. We mostly
follow the approach first proposed in [5, 34]. As a first step we assume the dynamics is perturbed by small noise
terms, ξ(t) and ζ(t):
x˙(t) = x(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gy(t, t′)x(t′)− r−1 lnx(t)− ρx(t) + ηx(t) + ξ(t)
]
,
y˙(t) = y(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′Gx(t, t′)y(t′)− r−1 ln y(t)− ρy(t) + ηy(t) + ζ(t)
]
. (C30)
and that we have small perturbation about a fixed point, i.e.
x(t) = x∗ + x̂(t), (C31)
y(t) = y∗ + ŷ(t), (C32)
ηx(t) = η
∗
x + v̂(t), (C33)
ηy(t) = η
∗
y + ŵ(t). (C34)
Perturbations are here labelled by hats on the corresponding variables, this is not to be confused with the notation
x̂i, ŷj etc in earlier sections, where, in the course of computing the generating functional, hats indicated conjugate
variables. Following [5, 6] we restrict the analysis to cases where x∗ > 0 and y∗ > 0. Expanding to linear order in the
deviations from the fixed point we then have
d
dt
x̂(t) = −r−1x̂(t) + x∗
[
Γ
∫
dt′ Gy(t− t′)x̂(t′) + v̂(t) + ξ(t)
]
,
d
dt
ŷ(t) = −r−1ŷ(t) + y∗
[
Γ
∫
dt′ Gx(t− t′)ŷ(t′) + ŵ(t) + ζ(t)
]
. (C35)
In Fourier space we have [
iω + r−1
x∗
− ΓG˜y(ω)
]
x˜(ω) = v˜(ω) + ξ˜(ω),[
iω + r−1
y∗
− ΓG˜x(ω)
]
y˜(ω) = w˜(ω) + ζ˜(ω), (C36)
for which we will introduce the short-hand notation
A(ω, x∗)x˜(ω) = v˜(ω) + ξ˜(ω),
B(ω, y∗)y˜(ω) = w˜(ω) + ζ˜(ω). (C37)
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Denoting the fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability by φ (not to be confused with the memory-loss
parameter φ in earlier sections), and taking into account that we are only considering components with x∗ > 0, y∗ > 0
this gives (for details of similar calculations see [5])
〈|x˜(ω)|2〉∗ = φ (〈|y˜(ω)|2〉∗ + 1)〈 1|A(ω, x∗)|2
〉
∗
,
〈|y˜(ω)|2〉∗ = φ (〈|x˜(ω)|2〉∗ + 1)〈 1|B(ω, x∗)|2
〉
∗
, (C38)
where we have used the self-consistency relations
〈|v˜(ω)|2〉∗ = 〈|y˜(ω)|2〉∗ and 〈|w˜(ω)|2〉∗ = 〈|x˜(ω)|2〉∗.
Again following [5] let us now focus on the ω = 0 mode. Using the symmetry between players we have〈|x˜(ω = 0)|2〉∗ = 〈|y˜(ω = 0)|2〉∗, and hence we find
〈|x˜(ω = 0)|2〉∗ =
 1
φ
〈
1
|A(ω=0,x∗)|2
〉
∗
− 1
−1 . (C39)
This expression diverges, as
φ
〈
1
| r−1x∗ − Γχ|2
〉
∗
= 1, (C40)
signalling the onset of instability. In particular Eq. (C39) predicts a negative value of
〈|x˜(ω = 0)|2〉∗, if
φ
〈
1
|A(ω=0,x∗)|2
〉
∗
< 1, indicating that our self-consistent fixed-point solution breaks down. Eq. (C40) therefore
defines the boundary of the stable fixed point phase, and was used to generate the stability diagram in the main paper
(Fig. 2). The fraction of active strategies is here given by φ = 1, following our solution for fixed points of the effective
process (we find that Eq. (C27) has positive solutions x(z) for all values of z, provided Γ < 0).
Appendix D: Numerical methods and simulation results
1. Test of theoretical predictions against simulations
a. Order parameters in fixed point phase
Eqs. (C29) together with Eq. (C27) are the final result of our path-integral analysis in the fixed-point phase.
These equations determine the relevant order parameters χ, q and ρ self-consistently. We notice the high degree of
nonlinearity due to the logarithmic term in (C27). In absence of this term (i.e. for r−1 = 0) the resulting equations are
linear and the Gaussian integrals in (C29) can be carried out and the resulting equations can be simplied further, see
[5, 35, 36]) for details. In the presence of memory-loss (r−1 > 0) this is not possible however, and we have to approach
the self-consistency problem numerically. We here restrict the analysis to the case Γ < 0, when a positive solution
of (C27) is found for all values of z. Numerically solving Eq. (C27) gives x(z) with an iterative Newton-Raphson
procedure then allows us to determine the order parameters χ, q, ρ [48]. Once these order parameters are determined
the distribution of the components of the strategy vectors can be obtained from solving the above Eq. (C27)
−r−1 lnx(z) + Γχx(z) +√qz − ρ = 0.
More precisely one has
P (x) =
∫
dz
e−z
2/2
√
2pi
δ(x− x(z)) (D1)
for the distribution of fixed points of the effective process. Recalling that degrees of freedom in the path-integral
analysis have been obtained from the original strategy components by a re-scaling with a factor of N (
∑
i xi = N
instead of
∑
i xi = 1), an analytical prediction for the distribution of strategy components of the original problem at
a large but finite value of N can be obtained using Eq. (D1), and upon undoing this re-scaling. Results are shown in
Fig. 4 of this Supplementary Information (left-hand panel). As seen in the figure the analytical predictions for this
17
FIG. 4: Test of theoretical predictions for the stable phase against simulations. The left-hand panel shows the distribution
of components xi of mixed strategies at the fixed point (Γ = −0.5). Solid lines are theoretical predictions, noisy lines from
simulations. The right-hand panel shows the entropy S of the fixed point strategies of players. Symbols are from simulations
(at N = 100 strategies per player, simulations run for 7, 500 time steps, with measurements starting after 5, 000 time steps).
Averages over 100 different payoff matrices are taken. Solid lines are from the theory, hence only shown in the stable phase
in the right-hand panel. Agreement with simulations is good, except for small deviations near the onset of instability. We
attribute these to finite-size and equilibration effects. All data in this figure is taken at β = 0.01.
highly non-trivial and non-Gaussian distribution agree rather well with results from direct simulations of the original
learning dynamics.
We can also determine the entropy of a typical mixed strategy of a system at finite N at the fixed point as follows.
Given the normalisation
∑
i xi = N we define S to be the entropy of the mixed strategy vector (x1/N, . . . , xN/N),
i.e.
S = −
∑
i
xi
N
ln
xi
N
= − 1
N
∑
i
xi lnxi + ln(N)
= −〈x(z) ln(x(z))〉z + ln(N), (D2)
where 〈. . .〉z denotes an average over z, i.e. 〈· · ·〉z =
∫
dz · · · e−z
2/2√
2pi
. Results are shown in Fig. 4 of this Supplementary
Information (right panel), and again theoretical predictions and direct measurements from simulations agree very
well. We note that mixed strategies concentrate on the centre of strategy space the for α/β →∞, i.e. for very quick
memory loss. In this case one has xi ≈ 1 for all i (recall the normalisation
∑
i xi = N), i.e.
S = −
∑
i
xi
N
ln
xi
N
≈ −
∑
i
1
N
ln
1
N
= ln(N). (D3)
As a final remark we point out that Eqs. (C29) and Eq. (C27) are valid only in the fixed point phase, as the
assumption of a fixed point was explicitly made in deriving these relations. We are therefore only able to predict the
statistics of the solution in the stable fixed point phase. The solution of the effective dynamics below the transition, in
the chaotic regime, is a formidable task. No promising approaches are available, similar to lack of analytical handles
for example on the ‘turbulent’ so-called non-ergodic phase of the minority game [33].
b. Onset of instability
The validity of the analytical predictions for the onset of instability (boundary of the chaotic phase) has already been
successfully confirmed in simulations in Fig. 2 of the main paper, where we have measured the expected dimension
18
FIG. 5: Test of theoretical predictions for the stability diagram. Solid line shows the onset of instability as predicted by the
theory (see Eq. (C40)). Markers show results from simulations (see text for details). All data in this figure is taken at β = 0.01.
of the dynamical attractors in parameter space. These simulations are time-consuming and were therefore limited to
systems of dimension 2(N − 1) = 98. In order to provide a more precise verification we have determined the onset of
instability in larger systems in Fig. 5 of this Supplementary Material. The numerical data is here obtained as follows:
1. For a fixed value of Γ generate M samples of the payoff bi-matrix.
2. For these M realisations of the game, run the dynamics at large α/β and, for each sample determine whether
or not it reaches a stable fixed point.
3. If the majority of the M samples converges to a fixed point, lower the value of α/β and repeat step 2 until more
than half of the samples no longer converge.
4. Record this value of α/β as the onset of instability, and proceed to a new value of Γ in 1.
In the simulations of Fig. 5 we have used M = 10 samples. A given run is considered to reach a fixed point if
both (i) all eigenvalues of the Jacobian at a final time T are within the unit circle and (ii) the total fluctuations
N−1
∑
i
[
3/T
∑T
t=2/3T xi(t)
2 −
(
3/T
∑T
t=2/3T xi(t)
)2]
are less that a pre-defined threshold ϑ. In our simulations we
have used T = 15, 000 and ϑ = 10−5. If these criteria are not fullfilled the run is considered not to converge. We
cannot entirely exclude to identify runs as non-convergent, when in fact they do converge on time scales larger than
T . In this sense we can not exclude a potential over-estimation of the value α/β at which the instability sets in
in the numerical results presented in Fig. 5. The agreement with the theoretical predictions is very good however.
Small deviations can be attributed to the effect just discussed, and to the fact that the theoretical prediction of the
instability line is obtained for the continuous-time dynamics, whereas simulations are carried out for the discrete-time
map at β = 0.01. Additionally there may be potential finite size effects.
2. Estimation of the attractor dimension
The Liapunov spectrum of the attractors are determined using a procedure similar to that described in [38].
Measurements are started after some equilibration time (teq = 150, 000 iterations), after which we run a linearised
map
z(t+ 1) = Jx(t),y(t)z(t), (D4)
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parallel to the simulation of the original system, with L = 2(N − 1) degrees of freedom. The L× L matrix Jx(t),y(t)
is the Jacobian of the full non-linear system. We run L copies of the linearized dynamics, z(1), . . . , z(L) started from
the L unit vectors. We then regularly perform a stabilized Gram-Schmidt procedure, and obtain estimates of the
Liapunov exponents [38]. From these estimates one then calculates the Kaplan-Yorke dimension as
D = j −
∑j
i=1 λi
λj+1
, (D5)
where the Liapunov exponents are ordered as λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λL, and where j is the largest integer such that
λ1 + · · · + λj ≥ 0 [38, 39]. The estimates of the attractor dimension may fluctuate as the simulation run continues
after equilibration, and as the attractor is sampled. In practice we find that the measured dimension tends to converge
in most runs as the duration of the simulation increases. In our simulations we consider the attractor dimension in
a given run as converged when the difference between the maximum and minimum estimate of the dimension in a
time window of 20, 000 iteration steps deviate by less than 5% from each other. The dimension reported is then the
average over that time window. In other words, simulations are first run for 150, 000 steps to equilibrate, then at
least 20, 000 iterations additional are performed during which measurements are taken. Subsequently the simulation
is extended (up to at most 106 iterations) until the convergence criterion is met. In practice we find that most samples
have converged at 106 iterations or earlier, when we terminate our simulation. Examples of such measurements are
shown in Fig. 6 of this Supplementary Information, the data shown corresponds to the attractors shown in Fig. 1
of the main paper. Samples that have not converged on this time scale are ignored in our analysis, and have been
disregarded when compiling the data for Fig. 2 of the main paper. We here find that only a small fraction of samples
converges when the attractor dimension is very high.
3. Return distribution
The time series of ‘returns’ in Fig. 3 of the main manuscript shows the changes of total payoff to the two players.
Specifically, we measure
Πtot(t) =
∑
i
∑
j
{xi(t)aijyj(t) + yi(t)bijxj(t)} (D6)
at each time step t in the equilibrated regime, and then plot Πtot(t)− Πtot(t− 1) in Fig. 3 of the main paper. The
corresponding distribution of returns is shown in Fig. 7 of this SI, and shows exponential tails.
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